In the critical battles that lay ahead in the state of New York, the pro-ratification party, or Federalists, counted themselves fortunate in being able to draw upon Jay’s literary and forensic ammunition. On 31 January 1788 Egbert Benson proposed to the state assembly the selection of the same number of convention delegates as state assemblymen by “all free male citizens of the age of twenty-one years and upwards” and that they meet in Poughkeepsie the third Tuesday in June. Despite obstructionist efforts by Antifederalists and the coolness of their leader, Governor George Clinton, both houses passed the resolution setting elections for the end of April.1

Nominees for New York City’s delegates were not limited to the two opposing blocs, but were initiated informally and in response to a groundswell of recognition for the quality of the Federalist leadership. As early as 16 February, “A Federalist” included Jay’s name on a list of candidates. On a second slate published 20 February, the writer asserted after Jay’s name: “From his long services abroad and at home, and the nature of his present office as minister of foreign affairs, [he] must be supposed to possess the best information of any man in the United States, on our relative situation with foreign nations.”2 Within a few weeks “An Independent Elector” and “A Citizen” included Jay on their proposed slates.3 On 9 April Thomas Randall (c. 1723–97), a prominent New York merchant, placed Jay on a more formal “Federal Ticket” for New York City and County on behalf of “a number of your fellow Citizens.” Jay’s name was also included in a nine-man slate adopted at a meeting “of a large number of respectable Mechanics and Tradesmen” assembled at Vandewater’s Tavern and chaired by Daniel Dunscomb. Other individuals and groups joined in endorsing Jay’s candidacy.4

Laudatory references to Jay were by no means uncommon. A contributor to Childs’s Daily Advertiser (New York) of 21 March not only included Jay on his own list but, for the benefit of voters who had been out of the city during the war years, added this observation:

The distinguished abilities, and unshaken integrity of Mr. JAY, recommended him at an early period of life, to all his acquaintance, as well as to the notice of the British Government, in the late Province of New-York, antecedent to the war; insomuch, that he would have been appointed to one of the first offices in that Province, upon the first vacancy that should happen. Nevertheless when the rights of his country became invaded by the British, he took a decided and active part in her favor; his uniform services since, both at home and abroad, particularly in the formation of the Treaty of Peace, so peculiarly advantageous and beneficial to the interest of the United States; in the management and prosecution of which, he had a principal share. Mr. Jay’s legal knowledge is incontrovertible; his arguments are methodically arranged and drawn forth with judgment; he reasons logically and well, and excells most men in dissecting the arguments of his opponents, and rendering them futile and nugatory; he is able and pointed in reply, and possesses the powers of persuasion in an eminent degree; in short, Mr. Jay is endowed with the necessary qualifications to constitute a Statesman.5

Nominations continued throughout the month of April, including one by a Federalist rhymester whose doggerel included: “Mr. Jay. Col. Hamilton, Harrison, Low / Are honest, good patriots all of us know.”6 Such effusive praise of Federalist candidates drew a sardonic response from one critic who, after presenting the Federalist slate, added: “Come Panegyric to our cits and swains, / Reveal our future bliss in flowing strains, / And tell each simple rough laborious fool, / The well born and the rich shall rule.”7

On the eve of the election a group of “Many Federalists” issued a broadside that purported to controvert the anti-lawyer bias of some Antifederalists but urged the electors “to chuse a less number of Lawyers,” perhaps two, and proposed a slate of nine, headed by lawyers John Jay and Alexander Hamilton, but with seven other nonlawyers, principally businessmen. That this piece was in fact a tactic of the Antifederalists to alert the voters to the dangers inherent in the proposed Constitution, which permitted the federal judiciary to intermeddle with the state courts, is a distinct possibility.8

Jay had predicted that the election would be “the most contested of any we have had since the Revolution.”9 In New York City, however, that prediction did not prove correct, for there the Antifederalists did not even enter a slate, although some scattered votes were cast for their candidates. Some 2,836 ballots were cast, the largest number yet recorded in a New York City election.10

Jay headed the victorious Federalist slate, according to the following votes: John Jay, 2,735; Richard Morris, 2,716; Alexander Hamilton, 2,713; John Sloss Hobart, 2,713; Robert R. Livingston, 2,712; Isaac Roosevelt, 2,701; James Duane, 2,680; Richard Harison, 2,677; Nicholas Low, 2,651.11 Upstate, however, the Antifederalists scored sweeping victories, giving them a more than two-to-one majority of convention delegates, but only fifty-six percent of the total vote cast.12

Long before the results were known, Jay realistically appraised the opposition as “so formidable that the Issue appears problematical.” Yet three weeks before the opening of the convention in Poughkeepsie, Jay seems to have identified the strategy of the Federalist camp. While writing Washington on 29 May that the majority of the delegation comprised “anti-fœderal Characters,” he then deleted from his original draft his wish that the election had been “a little longer delayed” as “the Constitution continues [to] gain ground daily.” The opposition had used “improper means” to deceive and alarm the people, “and with very considerable Success,” but, he added, “Truth is constantly extendg & will prevail.” In his draft Jay pointed out that these methods had aroused much indignation, that it was doubtful “whether the Leaders will be able to govern the Party,” and that “many in the opposition are friends to Union & mean well”, but their leaders were “very far from being Sollicitous about the Fate of the Union.” The leaders wanted the Constitution rejected swiftly with as little debate as possible, but he doubted whether their followers would take such “desperate” measures. The implication was clear: insist on full debate and divide the opposition on tactics. Jay also remarked that “An Idea has taken air that the Southern part of the State will at all Events adhere to the Union, & if necessary to that End seek a Separation from the northern.” The opposition feared that contingency and had no plans to cope with it. Jay struck out a last observation: “The Truth is,” he added, “that few among them are remarkable for talents,” but those few “may perhaps occasion” trouble.13

Jay’s observations were shrewd. Instead of deep-seated opposition to the idea of a federal union, there was a general consensus that the Confederation had to be replaced with something better. New York had been the first state to propose a general convention to revise the Articles of Confederation in July 1782. What the more persuadable Antifederalists really sought were assurances that the defects of the proposed Constitution could be remedied. Four days after the convention met, Jay wrote his wife that the “Proceedings and Debates have been temperate, and inoffensive to either Party,” even though “The opposition to the proposed Constitution appears formidable, the more so from numbers than other Considerations.”14

Jay might have added that the Federalist strategy that he had outlined in his letter to Washington was set in motion. On 19 June the convention adopted the resolution offered by Robert R. Livingston, “That no question, general or particular, should be put in the committee upon the proposed Constitution of Government for the United States, or upon any clause or article thereof, nor upon any amendment which should be reposed thereto, until after the said Constitution and amendments should have been considered clause by clause.”15 This strategy helped ensure ultimate success for the Federalists.

From this point on, the convention debated the Constitution article by article, and we can pursue Jay’s own remarks on the floor through some half-dozen accounts, printed or manuscript, all fragmentary. The fullest account was published by Francis Childs, who issued a set of Debates and Proceedings16 that unfortunately lacks a record of debates beyond 2 July and thereafter merely summarizes motions introduced. Supplementing it is the “Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention” kept by the convention’s secretary, John McKesson, in the New York State Library, as well as his “Notes” in the New-York Historical Society. To fill in missing gaps, and for comparative purposes, the editors also relied on Melancton Smith’s “Notes” in the State Library; the notes of Gilbert Livingston of Dutchess County, which contain the most complete record for the period beginning 14 July, in the New York Public Library; and contemporary newspaper coverage, as well as Jay’s correspondence during his weeks at Poughkeepsie. Full texts of most of these sources are now available in the Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, volumes 22 and 23.

Jay, although along with Hamilton and Robert R. Livingston one of the chief spokesmen for the Federalists at the convention, spoke infrequently during the first weeks. Nevertheless, an early appearance caught the fancy of a correspondent for the Daily Advertiser (New York). Reporting Jay’s remarks, he wrote: “After the Chancellor had concluded, Mr. Jay arose, commanding great respect and remarkable attention; he was heard with great pleasure and satisfaction; and, no doubt, he spoke convincingly on the points raised. He has the most peculiar knack of expressing himself I ever heard. FANCY, PASSION, and in short every thing that makes an ORATOR, he is a stranger to; and yet none who hear but are pleased with him, and captivated beyond expression. He appears to me not to speak as a scribe, but as a man having a right to speak, and at the same time having authority to command them to obey.”17 A gentleman in Poughkeepsie writing to his friend in Connecticut on 26 June, “found Mr. Jay’s reasoning” to be “weighty as gold, polished as silver and strong as steel.”18

From his initial speech on 23 June, in which he examined Article I, section 2, clause 3, supporting the ratio of one representative to 30,000 persons, Jay stressed moderation and persuasion. He continually pointed out areas of agreement with his opponents and distinguished between state and federal concerns. He declared the differences between the leader of the opposition bloc on the floor, the amiable Melancton Smith, and himself over the question of proper representation truly minimal, since Smith was willing to have the federal government possess the important power of war and peace. For the exercise of such great powers Jay was prepared to accept a relatively modest proportional representation in the lower house, while conceding the need for a much larger one in the state legislature to deal with internal domestic affairs. State legislatures were concerned with “Innumerable things” requiring “minute and local information.” The objectives of the general government were broad, comprehending “the interests of the States in relation to each other, and in relation to foreign powers.” We do not require our nation’s representatives to possess minute information about Suffolk, or Orange, or Ulster, he argued. He himself would have preferred a larger representation, Jay admitted, perhaps similar to what Smith desired, but because opinions on this figure were so diverse, “I think it best to let things stand as they are.” To placate the opposition he added: “If I could be convinced that danger would probably result from so small a number, I should certainly withhold my acquiescence.” Again, he employed a conciliatory peroration: “We did not come here to carry points. If the gentleman will convince me I am wrong, I will submit. … It is from this reciprocal interchange of ideas, that the truth must come out.”19

Jay subsequently rose to reply to Samuel Jones, who opposed giving Congress the power of prescribing the time, place, and manner of holding elections. Jay regarded the Constitutional provision as vital to “prevent the dissolution of the Union” in the event that a state “by design or accident” should fail to choose Senators or Representatives.20 At this time Jay reported to Washington that neither party had really budged the other, but “the greater number” of the Antifederalists were, in his opinion, “averse to a vote of Rejection.” Some would be content with recommendatory amendments; others wished for explanatory amendments to settle points of doubtful construction. Still a third group would insist on amendments before ratification, and were even in favor of adjourning to wait and see how the new government would operate before joining the Union. By this time the ninth state, New Hampshire, had ratified, and the new union was a fait accompli. Jay could now tell Washington that “the people … are gradually coming right notwithstanding the singular Pains taken to prevent it.”21

His relatively optimistic report to Washington notwithstanding, Jay was not sanguine about the outcome, writing to his friend John Vaughan on 27 June that “the Issue is uncertain.”22 Indeed, Jay had good reason for concern, as the convention turned to key issues of taxation and representation. On 26 June John Williams, an upstate delegate, proposed a resolution denying Congress the power to impose an excise tax on products grown or manufactured in the United States and strict limitations on direct taxes. Jay would have rushed into the fray at once, except for the fact that for a day or two Hamilton and John Lansing Jr. were feuding on the floor.23 Meantime, concerned that the federal government would have a monopoly on viable sources of taxation that would gradually starve the states into insignificance, the opposition had raised the issue of concurrent powers of the federal government and the states and proposed a ban on federal direct taxes without a requisition on the states. Jay felt that the observations on concurrent powers were “not matured” and on 30 June opposed moving on to the next clause of the Constitution until the issue was fully explored. Why take up matters “by halves,” he asked sarcastically? What was the rush—to go home “to cut our Grass”? Jay further insisted that opponents spend the time needed for clarifying their notion of direct taxes.24

On 1 July Jay took the floor to make one of his most telling speeches, insisting that “a government, which was to accomplish national purposes, should com[m]and the national resources.”25 Would it be right, he asked, for the interest of a part to supplant that of the whole? Distinguishing between general and specific taxes, he argued that, as regards the latter, Congress would be sufficiently informed to make appropriate decisions. As he saw it, no minute knowledge was required to impose taxes on luxuries—for example, a tax on coaches, or slaves, or plate. Recognizing that some ambiguity existed over the question of concurrent jurisdiction over taxation, Jay was prepared to have an explanatory clause incorporated. “[Doubts] may be cured by an explanatory amendment,” McKesson quotes him as conceding.26

The Antifederalists next moved beyond seeking to limit Congress’s taxing power to curbing the power of the federal government to borrow money. Lansing would have required nine states to acquiesce.27 Jay swiftly rose to his feet to point out that since “factions” were not unknown to republican governments, a third of Congress might prevent the other two-thirds from obtaining a loan “when the Exigencies of the State require it or when it would be for the public Good.” Even foreign nations might try to prevent Congress from borrowing money. Jay struck a sectional note. In case of a war, the Western states would have the power to refuse a loan to support the defense of the Atlantic states, the most likely targets and sufferers in such an eventuality. “Would you put it in the power of five Men to disarm a Continent?,” he asked. Hamilton reinforced Jay’s arguments in a powerful address, stressing national security considerations in supporting a loan by majority vote.28

Differences over textual matters, amendments compounding amendments—nothing could spoil an Independence Day celebration in Poughkeepsie. Despite unsettled weather, (it had been steadily raining for days), both factions celebrated a feast. As Jay described it, “two tables, but in different Houses” were laid out for the delegates, and “the two Parties mingled at each Table,” and toasts were announced “by sound of Drum, and accompanied by the Discharge of Cannon.”29 After this display of patriotic good will, the two parties continued their dissection of the Constitution. How different was the celebration in Albany, where Federalists and Antifederalists clashed, with one dead and eighteen participants wounded!30

On the Fourth of July Jay wrote John Adams that despite the many amendments proposed by the opposition, “we proceed with much Temper and moderation— I am not without Hopes of an accommodation, altho’ my Expectations of it are not very sanguine.”31 As he remarked to Virginia Federalist Francis Corbin that same day, there was reason for cautious optimism, since the people of the southern part of the state were “with great unanimity” advocates of the Constitution and “so great a Number of the States have adopted it.” With this trend in public opinion, Jay predicted that the opposition would seek “some Line of accommodation, that may acquit them with their Partizans.” Whether this face-saving would involve “conditional” or “recommendatory” amendments was still not clear.32 That same day Jay also composed a congratulatory note to Washington on Virginia’s ratification, assuring him that the Constitution “constantly gains advocates among the People, and its Enemies in the Convention seem to be much embarrassed.”33

By 8 July the delegates sitting as a Committee of the Whole had completed their examination of the Constitution, allowing Jay to write Washington that “the Ground of Rejection” seemed to be “entirely deserted,” with the opposition reported to be divided on whether to insist on “previous conditional amendments,” or on “subsequent” ones, to which latter view the “greater number” were disposed.34

By 10 July some fifty-five amendments had been proposed, which Lansing’s motion grouped into three categories: explanatory, conditional, and recommendatory. To deal both with the issue of the nature of ratification as well as the amendments, the Convention appointed a fourteen-man committee. What happened in committee was not included in the official reports but appears in the Daily Advertiser (New York) of 15 July, quoting a letter from Poughkeepsie, dated the morning of 11 July: “When the committee met, Mr. Jay declared that the word conditional should be erased before there could be any discussion on the merits of the amendment; this occasioned about an hour’s debate, and the Anties determining not to give up that point, the committee was dissolved without effecting any thing.” Backed by Judge Hobart and other Federalist colleagues, Jay argued that a conditional ratification amounted “to a virtual and total rejection of the Constitution; and declared they could not consult with them at all, if they insisted upon that point.” “Both parties were firm,” the report concluded, and the committee disbanded.35

On the afternoon of 11 July Jay reported the failure of the informal committee to agree. “No plan of conciliation has been formed,” he confessed, “and no measure taken.” Jay laid the blame at the door of the Antifederalists for “adhering rigidly to the principle of conditional adoption, which was inadmissible and absurd.” According to the correspondent, “he went into a consideration of the nature and tendency of such an adoption; compared it with the powers delegated to the Convention, and the powers of the future Congress; and inferred, that [a conditional ratification] would amount in result to a total rejection.” He called on the opposition repeatedly to answer his arguments. The next morning, 12 July, Jay opened the Convention’s business by charging “the unfairness of the proceedings of the informal Committee,” and registering the complaint that “when met for mutual discussion, they had only been insulted by a complete set of propositions in a dictatorial manner for their passive acquiescence.”36

On 11 July, Jay moved “the grand question” that the Constitution be ratified without conditions before considering any explanatory amendments. Jay was reported as having spoken “forcibly” and commanded “great attention.” Chancellor Livingston and Chief Justice Morris spoke in support of the motion, with Melancton Smith leading the opposition.37 One correspondent described the speeches of the Federalists as “masterly” and “animated” and reported that they “made sensible impressions on the minds of such anti-federal members, who have not yet rendered their conceptions entirely callous, by pre-conceived prejudice, to the voice of truth—to sound and eloquent reasoning.”38

The debate initiated on 11 July by Jay’s motion continued for four full days. As the debate drew to a close, Smith moved [on 15 July] that the Constitution be ratified on condition that a second convention be called to consider amendments limiting out-of-state activities by the militia, restricting the power of Congress to determine the time, place, and manner of elections, prohibiting federal excises, “ardent spirits excepted,” as well as the laying of direct taxes by Congress “within this state.”39

Hamilton conceded that his side was willing “to go as far as they thought safe, in recommendatory & explanitory Amend[ment]s,” and read a list of thirteen amendments that Federalists were prepared to support. Jay announced his backing for Hamilton’s list. “We are endeavouring to agree,” he remarked. “Gent[lemen] See we have brot forth valuable Amendmts.”40

Jay had noted on 14 July that the issues raised by Smith were matters to be decided by the people, not by their agents or attorneys.41 He followed on 15 July with an eloquent plea in which he praised some of the proposed amendments as “valuable,” while urging that the number be pared down to achieve a consensus.42 In one of his longer and more compelling arguments, Jay urged the defeat of the conditional amendments proposal. He pointed out that since Congress had no power to change any part of the Constitution, a conditional ratification would “of necessity” have the effect of keeping New York out of the Union. Then he struck a characteristic note combining conciliation and caution:

We are sent here on a most important occasion [by] Our Constituents calmly to consider and wisely to decide on the proposition before us. We were sent here to serve general Purposes and promote public Good. We should reason together; let us reason first and decide afterwards. This Constitution is the work of freemen who have given to the world the Highest Evidence of Patriotism, disinterestedness, wisdom and great Abilities. Therefore let us examine Cautiously before we reject.43

Jay then pointed out that ten states had already ratified, after having argued the merits at length. “It has grown too fast to be pulled up by the Roots.” His comments moved from issues of policy to those of expediency. Should we remain out of the Union, what, he asked, would be the internal condition of the state of New York? What about the attitude of our neighbor states? Meantime, the federal government will be organizing, laws will be made, and New York will have no hand in either activity. Consider the economic benefits, he reminded his listeners, of Congress sitting in New York and of the U.S. treasury and mint being located there, of the amount of specie the presence of the federal government will bring into the state. Let us remember, he counseled, that “many men of virtue” in other states found amendments desirable. “The door is open. Let us agree,” he urged. “We will have our Constitution and you will have your Amendments.”44

Melancton Smith on 17 July proposed a resolution supporting ratification, but reserving the right to withdraw within an unspecified number of years if the Constitution were not amended in a second convention to be called for in a circular letter to the other states setting forth the reasons for the call.45 After adjourning until the next day, the Convention once more went into a committee of the whole. “The Party seemed embarrassed, fearful to divide among themselves, and yet many of them were very averse to the new plan,” Jay reported to Washington.46 “It is difficult to conjecture what may be done out of Doors to Day,” Jay added, but a good deal must have been accomplished off the floor, and many scholars, reflecting the testimony of Anti-federalists, attributed the bulk of it to Jay’s persuasive voice.47

Jay, with support from Hamilton, closed the debate on Smith’s motion by reiterating that conditional ratification amounted to “no ratification.” Proposing amendments to the Constitution subsequent to its ratification was always acceptable to Jay, though he contested specific amendments that struck at the heart of the federal government’s ability to function. Thus, when on 22 July “the declaratory part of the proposed Bill of Rights came up for consideration, both Jay and Hamilton, according to a newspaper correspondent, merely “made some objections … to the wording of the several political maxims, and contended that some of them were not expressed with precision and accuracy, altho’ they were truths to which they readily yielded their assent.” As regards the proposed amendment curbing a standing army and federal control of the militia, Jay argued that the dictates of economy were against such curbs because “the government, contemplating their full and entire direction of the militia, would avoid the raising or the increase of their standing forces.” Furthermore, the dictates of safety were against it. For “the surest way to force government into the necessity of maintaining armies, was by fettering their authority over the militia.”48

From the beginning Jay sympathized with those who felt that the Constitution might be improved by amendments that would be in order following its adoption and in accordance with its own provisions. Thus, in the debates on a Bill of Rights on 19 July, Jay asked why the proponents singled out only three rights rather than listing all the unalienable rights, and he opposed extending an exemption to bearing arms to conscientious objectors other than Quakers.49 On 22 July Jay seconded Smith’s motion for an amendment setting a maximum eight-year term for President and supported it over Hamilton’s opposition.50 Jay would later introduce an amendment of his own.

By 23 July Jay could write Washington that the convention by a vote of 31 to 29 had adopted a motion of Samuel Jones and stricken out the words “on condition,” substituting “in full confidence.” He cautioned nonetheless that the opposition planned “to rally their forces” for a last stand. On 24 July Jay took the floor to call for unanimous agreement on a second convention, for “We are now one people all pledged for amend[ment]s.”51 On 25 July Jay himself proposed an amendment barring all except freeholders who were “natural born citizens” (with some specified exceptions) from eligibility for president, vice president, or members of either house of Congress, a restriction more severe than what he had suggested to Washington in July 1787. Lansing’s effort to delete the restriction to freeholders was defeated, and Jay’s proposed amendment was adopted by a large majority,52 and included in the final list of recommendatory amendments submitted by the Convention. Finally, Jay indicated a willingness to have the proposed Bill of Rights “expressly” reserve to the states and the people “all the rights not granted in the constitution.”53

Shortly thereafter a committee comprising Jay, Lansing, and Smith was charged with preparing a circular letter to the governors of the other states (26 July 1788). Jay’s principal authorship seems likely since a draft in the McKesson Papers is primarily in his hand, and he was far and away the most experienced draftsman of the three. The circular letter struck the conciliatory note that characterized Jay’s consistent performance:

We observe that amendments have been proposed and are anxiously desired by several of the states as well as by this; and we think it of great Importance that effectual measures be immediately taken for calling a Convention to meet at a Period not far remote. … It cannot be necessary to observe that no Govt., however constructed, can operate well, unless it possesses the Confidence and good will of the great Body of the People.54

The letter was agreed to unanimously. But the battle was not quite over. The convention had to vote down a new motion by Lansing reserving the right of the state to secede if the amendments were not adopted. Lansing’s motion was defeated by the close vote of 31 to 28. By almost the same slim margin of 30 to 27, the convention ratified the Constitution, with some Antifederalists, including Gilbert Livingston, Melancton Smith, and Samuel Jones, switching to the Federalist side, while seven other Antifederalists abstained.

It now appears that the objections to the Constitution on the part of the majority of New York’s Antifederalists were not so deep-seated that they could not be resolved by compromise short of conditional ratification. The sequence of events by which the Union had become a fait accompli before New York’s final vote weighed heavily on the delegates at Poughkeepsie. The prospect that the state might be left out of the union, and that New York City might go it alone, isolating the rest of the state and costing it substantial revenue, along with the city’s own concern that it might not be chosen as the seat of the new government should the state not ratify, seem to have been substantial considerations.55 Above all, enough men of good will remained conciliatory and flexible enough to be persuaded by better arguments. Enough trust was established that key Antifederalists believed their concerns would soon be addressed through amendments.

In that victory no inconsiderable part was played by the universally respected, courteous, conciliatory, open-minded, and persuasive Jay. From the start he had been prepared to consider amendments, and his willingness to accept some express reservation of state rights amounted to a major concession, one that would be implemented by Madison’s carefully phrased Tenth Amendment. Finally, in drafting the circular letter calling for a second convention, Jay went further in meeting the Antifederalist opposition than Federalist leaders present at other ratifying conventions. Indeed, while four other state conventions also called for amendments, New York alone called upon Congress for another convention under the procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution. In sum, when a Boston newspaper listed Jay among those not showing “blind idolatry” for the Constitution, it could justifiably point to the role Jay had played at Poughkeepsie.56

New York’s circular letter proved unwelcome news to Madison, who feared that it would have “a most pestilent tendency.”57 It encouraged the opposition in holdout states like North Carolina and Rhode Island to delay ratification.58 Nevertheless, Madison’s fears proved unfounded. In New York, despite a campaign launched on 30 October by a group of “Federal Republicans” headed by Customs Collector John Lamb,59 sentiments were already moving in a contrary direction. Jay could report to Edward Rutledge that the temper of the opposition, once “violent,” had “daily become more moderate.” The proposal for a second convention would, in Jay’s judgment, “terminate all questions on the subject. If immediately carried,” he observed, “its friends will be satisfied, and if convened three years hence, little danger, perhaps some good, will attend it.”60

The proposal for a second convention was also advanced by a Pennsylvania Antifederalist convention called in Harrisburg in September 1788, and by the Virginia legislature,61 but, when the proposition came before the House of Representatives in May 1789, Madison systematically pruned and styled the various amendments submitted by the ratifying conventions and reduced them in number to a Bill of Rights.62 Their adoption cut the ground from under the move for a second convention. Jay was not displeased.63